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I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently published for
comment a draft regulation entitled “Best Practices for the
1
Licensing of Genomic Inventions.”
The NIH believes that
“[a]necdotal and empirical data is beginning to reveal a pattern of
exclusive licensing practices for genomic technologies . . . that
could have detrimental effects on . . . the quantity and quality of
2
healthcare products and services.”
The NIH recommends
granting exclusive licenses when “necessary to encourage research
and development by private partners” and non-exclusive licenses
3
“whenever possible.” In contrast, a spokesperson for the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) states unequivocally
that there is no “evidence that the patenting of gene-related
4
inventions is impeding progress.”
This comment surveys the costs of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) diagnostic tests and argues in favor of non-exclusive
licensing as a means to provide broad access to affordable DNA
diagnostic testing. Part II provides background information on
genetic testing, patenting genes as applied to genetic testing, the
5
Bayh-Dole Act, and technology transfer.
In addition, Part II
summarizes academic commentary regarding the implications of
6
exclusive licensing for biotechnology. Scholars propose a number
7
of solutions, including expanding the experimental use exception.

1. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 69 Fed. Reg.
67747 (proposed Nov. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Licensing Genomic Inventions].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 67748.
4. Lee Drutman, It’s in the Genes: Patent Barriers to Genetic Research, 25
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 17 (July 1, 2004).
5. See infra Part II.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Part III details proposed rulemaking for DNA diagnostics. Part IV
reviews anecdotal examples of genetic testing for breast cancer,
9
hereditary hemochromatosis, and Canavan Disease. These genetic
testing examples include survey evidence from clinical
10
laboratorians. The survey and anecdotal evidence indicates that
patents may increase prices and reduce access to genetic testing.
This note contends that, although only a partial solution, Licensing
Genomic Inventions addresses genetic tests developed with NIH
11
funding. This comment also discusses improvements to the draft
12
language. Part V concludes that exclusive licensing increases the
13
prices of and decreases access to diagnostic genetic tests.
Licensing Genomic Inventions means to address the patent
system’s undesirable effects on the delivery of public health.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Genetic Testing
An all-inclusive definition of genetic testing is the “analysis of
human DNA, RNA [ribonucleic acid], chromosomes, proteins, and
certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease-related
genotypes, mutations, phenotypes, or karyotypes for clinical
14
purposes.” Genetic testing can provide clinical benefits as well as
15
diagnostic information to aid in difficult clinical decision-making.
Most genetic testing involves rare diseases, but the scope is
expanding to include genetic risk assessment for common diseases
16
such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.
With some genetic
tests, however, “[t]he identification of risk does not necessarily lead
17
to treatment options.”
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867, 1867 (2002)
(citation ommited).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1868. With Huntington’s disease, which currently has no treatment,
it is possible to associate the severity and onset of the disease with the length of
repeated non-coding regions within the gene. See id. The individual choice to
undergo testing is thus potentially psychologically harmful. Id. at 1867-70. In the
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DNA diagnostic tests encompass a subset of genetic testing.
DNA diagnostic tests recently came to the forefront of genetic
testing because of the DNA sequence information that emanated
from the Human Genome Project, the availability of inexpensive
molecular genetic technologies (such as polymerase chain reaction
(PCR)), and the existence of a genetic component in nearly every
18
disease. One can obtain genetic testing information through a
19
variety of molecular analyses.
20
Currently, there are clinical tests for more than 790 diseases.
New genetic associations between molecular markers and diseases
are published monthly; these new genetic associations make tests
21
available for an increased number of diseases. Mass screening has
begun for cystic fibrosis while screening for a variety of other
22
In addition, biological,
diseases has been discussed.
methodological, ethical, and social complexities involved in genetic
23
testing affect genetic tests for disease associations.
Concerns
persist regarding the possible effect genetic testing has on
24
obtaining insurance coverage.

United Kingdom, only about twenty percent of those at risk for Huntington’s
disease undergo the test. Id. at 1870.
18. Wayne Grody, Molecular Genetic Risk Screening, 54 ANN. REV. MED. 473, 474
(2003).
19. Molecular biological techniques used in genetic testing include: DNA
sequencing, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis (also
termed Southern blot hybridization), RNA expression analysis, PCR amplification,
fluorescent in situ hybridization, and cytogenetic analysis. Peter Kopp & J. Larry
Jameson, TRANSMISSION OF HUMAN DISEASE in PRINCIPLES OF MOLECULAR MEDICINE
50 (J.L. Jameson ed., 1998).
20. University of Washington-Seattle, GeneTests: Medical Genetics Information
Resource Database Online (1995-2005), at http://www.genetests.org (last visited Feb.
11, 2005) [hereinafter GeneTests].
21. There are currently 1637 clinical disorders for which a genetic mutation
is known. Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/entrez/query.fcgi?db=OMIM (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
22. Grody, supra note 18, at 473. Diseases for which mass screening has been
discussed include hereditary hemochromatosis, thrombophilias, familial cancer
predisposition, and pharmacogenetic risk factors. Id.
23. See id. at 475-76.
24. According to the National Library of Medicine, “[i]n many cases, health
insurance plans will cover the costs of genetic testing when it is recommended by a
person's doctor. . . . [But different] health insurance providers have different
policies about which tests are covered. . . . [In addition, individuals] may choose
not to use their insurance to pay for testing because the results of a genetic test
can affect a person's health insurance coverage.” Will Health Insurance Cover the
Costs of Genetic Testing?, U.S. National Library of Medicine, at
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/info=genetictesting/show/insurance_coverage
(last
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A large number of laboratories and clinics perform genetic
25
tests. Currently, genetic testing is accomplished with “home-brew”
tests performed in-house by the manufacturer and marketer, and
thus the tests fall outside the Food and Drug Administration’s
26
(FDA’s) review. With demand for genetic tests expected to grow,
manufacturers propose diversified FDA regulation in this area of
27
the medical laboratory.
B. Patenting Genes
In a landmark patent decision, the Supreme Court granted
patent protection to living organisms as long as the organisms
28
remain “human-made” and not “products of nature.” Dr. Ananda
Chakrabarty “constructed” a microorganism containing a number
29
of different plasmids that allowed it to digest hydrocarbons. In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court invoked the language
from the 1952 Patent Act, which states that “anything under the
30
sun that is made by man” is patentable. This watershed decision
ultimately resulted in the development of the biotechnology
31
industry by providing patent protection for biological inventions.

visited Feb. 11, 2005).
25. See Kopp & Jameson, supra note 19. A voluntary listing of laboratories
indicates that 575 laboratories and 1078 clinics perform genetic testing services.
GeneTests, supra note 20.
26. See Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic
Testing Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1211, 1211, 1229-32 (1997) (concluding “that the present regulatory system is
inadequate and places a dangerous amount of reliance on primary care
physicians”).
27. See Elizabeth Mansfield, Genetic Testing and Personalized Medicine: An FDA
View, 1 PRECLINICA 155 (2003). Laboratory tests, regulated under the Clinical
Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), involve emphasis on
analytical test performance and quality control. Steven Gutman & David W. Feigel
Jr.,
The
Status
of
ASR
Regulations
(May
2004),
available
at
http://www.devicelink.com /ivdt/archive/04/05/007.html. In 1997, the FDA
began regulating components of in-house tests and analyzing specific reagents
(ASRs). See id. ASRs include nucleic acid sequences and similar reagents
intended for use in a diagnostic application for identification of a substance in
biological specimens. Id. Manufacturers propose a new regulatory category
termed in vitro analytical tests (IVAT) for which analytical utility is established but
clinical utility has not yet been proven. Id.
28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
29. Id. at 305.
30. Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
31. DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
PATENTING 67 (2004).
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Recently, United States courts have upheld the patenting of genes
32
from mammals and plants.
In 1982, the United States Patent Office issued the first gene
patent to the Regents of the University of California for work
carried out on the construction of a plasmid contained in a
bacterium
and
expression
of
genes
for
chorionic
33
somatomammotropin.
Two years later, one of the first patent
claims for diagnostic detection of a disease gene was for the
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) test for
34
Huntington’s disease.
Thus, courts uphold gene patents in
diagnostic use claims.
An invention in a United States patent application must satisfy
35
the utility requirement. The invention must contain a specific,
36
As a result, the utility
substantial, and credible utility.
requirement precludes patenting inventions such as the use of a
37
DNA sequence as landfill. It is also possible to satisfy the utility
requirement by showing a readily apparent and well-established
38
utility.
Recently, the first gene patent was issued to a patient advocacy
39
group. The four co-inventors from Hawaii assigned their rights to
32. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001) (affirming right to patent plant material); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866
(issued Apr. 12, 1988) (issuing patent for non-naturally occurring genetically
altered oncomouse).
33. U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (issued Dec. 14, 1982) (claiming “6. A
recombinant DNA transfer vector comprising codons for human growth
hormone”). Chorionic somatomammotropin is commonly known as the “human
growth” hormone. Id.
34. U.S. Patent No. 4,666,828 (issued May 19, 1987) (claiming “1. A method
for detecting the presence in a subject of the gene for Huntington's Disease which
comprises: analyzing the human chromosome 4 of said subject for a DNA
polymorphism linked to Huntington's Disease. 2. The method of claim 1 wherein
said polymorphism is a restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP).”). The
patent was filed on August 15, 1984. Id.
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112, (1952).
36. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-98 (proposed
Jan. 15, 2001) (internal regulation to be used by U.S. PTO personnel in their
review of patent applications for compliance with the "utility" requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 101).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Press Release, PXE International, U.S. Patent Office Issues First Gene
Patent to Patient Advocacy Group: Co-Inventors Include Non-Scientist “Mom”
(Aug. 24, 2004), at http://www.pxe.org/patent.html; Methods for diagnosing
Pseudoxanthoma elasticum, U.S. Patent No. 6,780,587 (issued Aug. 24, 2004)
(claiming “a method for screening a patient for the presence of the PXE mutation
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the University of Hawaii, which assigned its rights to the patient
40
advocacy group. Assignment of patent rights to advocacy groups
may have important implications for future disease gene diagnostic
patenting and test development. This could direct licensing
income obtained from genetic testing to further research and
development in addition to treatment for a specific genetic disease.
C. Patenting Genes in Europe and Canada
In Europe, patents are awarded upon successful
41
demonstration of novelty, utility, and an inventive step.
42
Additionally, patents must satisfy a moral requirement. The
oncomouse patent was not as broad when issued in Europe,
43
because it applied only to mice and not all rodents. In contrast,
Canada refuses to allow the oncomouse patent to issue because it
44
rebuffs the idea that life forms are patentable.
In the future, the Biotechnology Patents Directive “98/44” will
45
control European gene patents. Under the Directive, Article 5
allows the patenting of genes identical to those in the human body
. . .”).
40. See Press Release, PXE International, supra note 39.
41. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (Oct. 5, 1973), Art. 52,
available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52.
42. Id. at Art. 53 (stating “European patents shall not be granted in respect
of: (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to
‘ordre public’ or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to
be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of
the Contracting States; (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to
microbiological processes or the products thereof.”).
43. “EPO Oncomouse ruling,” News in Brief, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 937
(2004).
44. Harvard Coll. v. Can. Comm’r of Patents, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (holding that
a higher life form is not patentable under the Canadian Patent Act because it is
not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of
“invention”).
45. Council Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 5, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 (stating that
“1. The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and
the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial
sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions. 2. An element
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a
natural element. 3. The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence
of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application.”), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l21319980730en001300
21.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
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as long as the patent application discloses an “industrial
46
application.”
Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union
(EU), it is working on draft guidelines to put Swiss patent law in
47
line with 98/44. While the EU directive is silent on the scope of
protection, the proposed Swiss patent guidelines restrict a patent
on a gene sequence to a specific, credible, and non-speculative
48
function.
By limiting patent protection to the specific utility
claimed, the Swiss Patent Office believes the limitation will
stimulate specific gene research exploration for additional
49
utilities.
Between 2001 and 2003, Myriad Genetics received four
European patents for testing susceptibility to breast cancer and
50
ovarian cancer.
These patents were challenged by the Institut
Curie (Paris, France), and the BRCA2 gene test (EP 785216) was
overturned by the European Patent Office (EPO) in February
51
2004. In addition, the EPO revoked one of the BRCA1 gene tests
52
(EP 699754) in May 2004. The EPO found the BRCA1 patent
inadequately inventive under the provisions of European patent
53
In contrast, Cancer Research UK received a patent on
law.
BRCA2 in Europe and will make BRCA2 screening widely available

46.
47.

Id.
Jane Burgermeister, Swiss Patent Proposal Prompts Criticism, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1323, 1323 (2004).
48. Id. “Art. 8c (new) If the discovery relates to a non-synthetically developed
sequence or partial sequence the coverage is limited to the concrete functions
described in its patent. Art. 49 The patent application must contain: f. in the case
of a nucleotide sequence or partial sequence or partial sequence of a gene, a
concrete description of its function.” Bundesgesetz über die Erfindungspatente
(proposed alteration of the June 1954 Patent Act), available at
http://www.ige.ch/D/jurinfo/documents/j10013d.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
49. Burgermeister, supra note 47, at 1323.
50. European Patent No. 699754 (issued Jan. 10, 2001); European Patent No.
705903 (issued May 23, 2001); European Patent No. 705902 (issued Nov. 28, 2001)
(describing BRCA1-related inventions); European Patent No. 785216 (issued Jan.
8, 2003) (describing BRCA2-related invention).
51. Graeme O’Neill, How Myriad’s GCAT got out of the bag, AUSTRALIAN
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Jun. 21, 2004, at 1, available at http://esvc001057.wic005u.
server-web.com/archives/1/220/447/How%20Myriads%20GCAT%20got%
20out% 20of%20the%20bag%2024062004.pdf.
52. Press Release, European Patent Office, Myriad/Breast Cancer Patent
Revoked After Public Hearing (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.europeanpatent-office.org/news/pressrel/2004_05_18_e.htm.
53. Andrew Pollack, European Patent on U.S. Gene Test is Revoked, INTL. HERALD
TRI., May 20, 2004, at 16, available at 2004 WL 77528899, at *1.
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54

across Europe.
There is a belief in Europe that gene patents will have a
55
negative influence on providing healthcare. It is feared that the
56
BRCA1 gene patents will create a precedent. Due to the large
number of patent applications on genes filed over the last few
years, there are concerns that monopoly rights to genes and
genetic testing will undermine reimbursement systems and
57
negatively influence European healthcare.
D. The Bayh-Dole Act
58

The policy and objective of the Bayh-Dole Act (Act) is “to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development” and “to promote the
commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the
59
United States.”
The Act sponsors believed that university
ownership of patent rights would allow the grant of exclusive
60
licenses to private firms.
The sponsors thought university
ownership was necessary for the development of commercial
61
products from government-sponsored research discoveries.
The Act permits universities to “retain title to any subject
62
invention” and subjects universities to “a requirement that the
63
contractor share royalties with the inventor.” The Act specifies
that any remaining royalties “shall be used by the contractor for

54. Press Release, Cancer Research UK, Charities to Make Breast Cancer
(BRCA2) Gene Freely Available Across Europe (Feb. 11, 2004),
at
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/news/pressreleases/breastcancergene_11feb04
?version=1.
55. Swiss Society of Medical Genetics, BCRA1 Patent, at http://www.ssgm.ch
/sections/News/brca1testing.htm (last visited Aug. 31. 2004).
56. Press Release, Curie Institut, European-Wide Opposition Against the
Breast Cancer Patents (Sept. 26, 2002), at http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/
europeanoppmyriad _sept02_gb.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (1994)).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1952).
60. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003).
61. Id.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2004) (stating that “[e]ach nonprofit organization or
small business firm may, within a reasonable time after disclosure as required by
paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to any subject invention.”).
63. Id. § 202(c)(7)(B).
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scientific research, development, and education.”
While rights
were originally granted to nonprofit organizations and small
companies, President Reagan extended these rights to large
65
corporations. The Act also prescribes “march-in rights” to allow
the federal agency responsible for funding the invention to require
“the contractor . . . to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or
exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant” if
66
certain conditions are not met. Exercise of march-in rights may
be necessary in the following situations:
• if “effective steps” have not been taken “to achieve
practical application of the subject invention;”
• to “alleviate health or safety needs;”
• “to meet requirements for public use specified by
federal regulations;” or
• if the subject invention is not manufactured
67
substantially in the United States.
In a few publicly known cases, NIH commented on the
exercise of march-in rights and then refused to exert them. In the
first case, CellPro petitioned NIH to enforce its march-in rights to
four federally funded Johns Hopkins University (JHU) patents that
68
JHU had licensed to Baxter Health Care Corporation. CellPro
wanted NIH to intervene to alleviate alleged health or safety needs
because the infringement of CellPro’s patents on those of Baxter
69
Healthcare precluded further sale of a stem cell separation device.
NIH stated that both companies failed to present evidence that cell
separation devices improve stem cell engraftment, disease free
70
survival, or overall survival. Thus, NIH declined to intervene and

64. Id. § 202(c)(7)(E)(i).
65. Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 12,618, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,661 (Dec. 22, 1987) (allowing
executive departments to enter into cooperative research projects with the private
sector, and providing ownership of title to patents resulting from research to the
contractors in exchange for royalty-free use by the government).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2004).
67. Id. §§ 203(a)(1)-(4) to 204 (2004).
68. See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095
(1999).
69. Harold Varmus, M.D., National Institutes of Health, Office of the
Director, Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., (Aug. 1, 1997),
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-01.htm.
70. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/10

10

Weck: Note: Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a Negative
10WECK.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 4:31:31 PM

EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF DNA DIAGNOSTICS

1067
71

exercise march-in rights either for health or safety reasons or for
inability to “achieve practical application of the subject invention in
72
such field of use.”
NIH more recently declined to exercise march-in rights in a
case where the price quadrupled for Abbott Laboratories’ (Abbott)
73
Norvir® (ritonavir), a drug used to treat patients with HIV/AIDS.
NIH had funded preclinical research for about $3.5 million and
Abbott had invested over three hundred million dollars to continue
74
developing the drug in an effort to bring it to market. Following a
public hearing on May 25, 2004, NIH found that Abbott sufficiently
showed the practical application of the subject invention under 35
U.S.C. § 203(a) because of the “manufacture, practice and
operation of ritonavir and the drug’s availability and use by the
75
public.” The complainants presented no evidence at the hearing
to show that march-in rights could alleviate any health or safety
76
needs not reasonably satisfied by Abbott. NIH agreed with public
testimony that the exercise of march-in rights was not an
appropriate way to address drug prices, but instead suggested that
77
Congress should address the issue.
NIH maintained that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the appropriate agency to
78
address any question of anticompetitive behavior by Abbott.
E. Experimental Use Exemption
Statutory and common law components define the
79
The Hatchexperimental use defense in the United States.
80
Waxman Act created a statutory experimental use defense and
gave proprietary pharmaceutical manufacturers a patent extension
71. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(2) (2004).
72. Varmus, supra note 69; see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(1) (2004).
73. Elias A. Zerhouni, M.D., National Institute of Health, Office of the
Director, In the Case of Norvir® Manufactured by Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (July
29, 2004), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Reports/March-In-Norvir.pdf.
74. Bonnie Joy Sedlak, National Institutes of Health Decides Not to March in:
Exploring the Decision Reached in the Case of Abbott’s Norvir, 24 GENETIC ENGINEERING
NEWS 1, 18 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for
an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 459 (2004).
80. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)).
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81

to cover delays in testing obligations. This statutory use defense
was “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the
82
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. . . .”
Two recent cases highlight what remains of the experimental
use defense. The Madey v. Duke University decision essentially
eliminated the common law experimental use defense for
83
universities. Duke University was using patented laser technology
84
in its teaching and research laboratory. In that case, the court
concluded “the experimental use defense persists albeit in [a] very
85
narrow form. . . .” The court followed reasoning in Embrex, where
the court interpreted the experimental use defense narrowly and
limited its scope to actions performed “for amusement, to satisfy
86
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”
Madey’s
holding may mean that most university research will fail to fall
87
within the research exception.
Integra Lifesciences I v. Merck KGaA highlights how narrowly
88
courts interpret the statutory defense. In Integra, the defendants
used a peptide, employed originally in wound healing, in
89
experiments to identify the best drug for halting tumor growth.
The court found the new use of halting tumor growth fell short of
benefiting from the statutory experimental use defense because the
“statutory language strictly limits the exemption ‘solely’ to uses with
90
a reasonable relationship to FDA procedures.”
The doctrine exempting experimental use from infringement
has considerably more breadth in Europe and Japan than in the
91
United States. Various European states define the experimental
81. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 459.
82. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(1) (West 2004).
83. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
958 (2003).
84. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1361.
86. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
87. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 461.
88. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 863. “The Scripps-Merck experiments did not supply information
for submission to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but
instead identified the best drug candidate to subject to future clinical testing
under the FDA processes.” Id. at 865.
90. Id. at 866.
91. Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-38
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92

use exception in their patent law.
Under German law, the
patentee’s rights do “not extend to acts performed for
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the
93
patented invention.”
“French law provides that ‘acts
accomplished for personal or domestic purposes or for the purpose
of testing the object of the patented invention shall not be
94
considered as affecting the patentee’s rights.’”
Japanese law
provides that “‘the effects of the patent right shall not extend to the
working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment or
95
research.’”
F.

Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Licensing

Anecdotal evidence suggests that exclusive licensing of DNA
diagnostics hinders innovation, reduces quality, sidesteps
96
regulatory approval, and increases costs. Patented diagnostics do
not allow the study of a gene in local laboratories if all the samples
97
must be shipped off to a reference laboratory.
A broad-based
preliminary survey showed that non-profit organizations licensed
DNA inventions exclusively at more than twice the rate of
98
companies.
Additional survey evidence indicates that in the previous three
years, nearly twenty percent of life science faculty have delayed
publication of research results by at least six months to pursue a
99
patent application. In addition, the most productive laboratories
(2001).
92. See id. at 39.
93. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
94. Id. n.187 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
96. Shanshan Zhang, High Tech Law Institute Publications: Proposing Resolutions
to the Insufficient Gene Patent System, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
1139, 1158-59 (2004).
97. O’Neill, supra note 51.
98. Michelle R. Henry et al., A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA Inventions,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 444 (2003).
99. David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life
Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997). The 3394
faculty members in the fifty universities receiving the most NIH funding in 1993
were asked whether they had “delayed publication of their research results for
more than [six] months” and whether they had “refused to share research results
with other university scientists in the last three years.” Id. “A total of 410
respondents (19.8%) reported that publication of their research results had been
delayed by more than [six] months at least once in the last [three] years to allow
for patent application, to protect their scientific lead, to slow the dissemination of
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100

maintained the most pronounced delays.
In another series of
interviews with clinical laboratories, responses indicated patented
tests stopped laboratories from performing some diagnostic genetic
101
tests.
Companies and non-profit institutions differ in their strategy
and breadth of patent coverage and the extent to which exclusive
licenses are used. Generally, non-profits grant more licenses that
102
There is also a concern that raising the cost of
are exclusive.
access to diagnostic technologies through patents may be retarding
103
the pace of biomedical discovery. Industry and researchers argue
104
over how valid the data is that supports these contentions.
Royalties on diagnostic tests account for two to ten percent of the
test cost and in the absence of commercial tests, individual
105
hospitals would be responsible for test development costs.
G. Criticisms of Bayh-Dole Act Relative to DNA Diagnostics
Two critics argue that Bayh-Dole went too far in making results
of publicly funded research in the health arena patentable at the
expense of benefits to the general public. Rai and Eisenberg
contend that the Bayh-Dole Act should be “reformed” to give
funding agencies greater discretion to determine when to require
that publicly funded research discoveries be dedicated to the public
106
domain.

undesired results, to allow time to negotiate a patent, or to resolve disputes over
the ownership of intellectual property. Also, 181 respondents (8.9%) reported
refusing to share research results with other university scientists in the last [three]
years.” Id.
100. Id.
101. Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3 (2003).
102. See Henry, supra note 98, at 447. A 1999 survey indicated that sixteen
percent of licenses granted by NIH were exclusive while fifty percent of licenses
granted by universities were exclusive. Id. Furthermore, companies reported
granting an average of twenty-seven percent exclusive licenses for all licenses
granted while for non-profits the average was sixty-eight percent. Id. at 444.
103. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021
(2003).
104. See Henry, supra note 98 (arguing that patents have a negative impact on
the cost and availability of genetic testing); Ken Chahine, Industry Opposes Genomic
Legislation, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 419 (2002) (arguing that in the long term
the lack of patent protection for diagnostic tests would have a negative impact on
biotech funding).
105. See Chahine, supra note 104.
106. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
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The Tragedy of the Anticommons

The tragedy of the commons theory was originally proposed to
explain the overuse of resources owned in common with no
107
incentive for conservation. The theory predicts that privatization
of public resources would increase resource utilization
108
effectiveness. The anticommons effect unexpectedly results from
encouraging privatization, whereas a proliferation of patents on
upstream inventions discourages the development of downstream
109
inventions.
Some experts argue this could stifle important
110
Heller and Eisenberg famously posited the
medical inventions.
“tragedy of the anticommons” to suggest that scarce resources are
111
underutilized because too many owners can block each other.
These blocking patents also referred to as a “patent thicket,”
consist of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company
must attempt to navigate through in order to commercialize a new
112
technology. With too many patents, a company may not develop
a new product because of the fear of infringement. When a single
firm did not control the components of the production of brass,
copper, and zinc, the price of brass was higher and this illustrates
113
the problem of complementary monopolies.
In addition, the
114
This is similar
profits of the producers were shown to be lower.
to the current problem in many industries with a large number of
upstream patent holders possibly preventing the development of
new technology.
2.

Responses to the Anticommons Argument

The anticommons hypothesis has generated a powerful
paradigm in which one can examine the effects of patenting on
innovation and use of technology in the biotechnology field.

Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2003).
107. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. CARL SHAPIRO, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 123 (Adam Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
113. Id. at 124-25.
114. Id. at 125.
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There have been a number of academic comments published
regarding the anticommons theory. A sample of the representative
arguments is presented below.
a.

No Anticommons Problem

Some commentators have concluded that there is no
anticommons problem. Professor Merges notes that in some cases,
commercial firms have been injecting information into the public
115
domain. As an example, biotechnology firms invested millions of
dollars in public domain gene sequence databases to prevent the
hold-up of their research by patents issued on short gene
116
sequences.
The issuance of these first patents on single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) led ten pharmaceutical
117
The
companies to establish the SNP Consortium in 1999.
original goal of the SNP Consortium was to place 300,000 SNPs
118
throughout the human genome in the public domain. The final
release of the SNP Consortium placed 1.25-million SNPs in the
119
public domain. Professor Merges believes that policy makers
should examine these private sector responses before
implementing major changes in response to an anticommons
120
situation.
Professor Kieff disagrees with the possible negative effects of
the anticommons theory and believes that patents on inputs do not
121
decrease production of outputs.
There is a large incentive for
biotechnology patentees to license technology as a means of
122
This incentive makes
reducing the risk of commercialization.
sense for “Big Pharma,” where the cost of commercializing a new
123
drug may average $800 million and fifteen years.
Once a
115. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
183, 190 (2004).
116. Id. at 183.
117. Id. at 190.
118. Id.
119. The SNP Consortium Ltd., SNP Data Release Notes, available at
http://snp.cshl.org/about/2001_TSC_project_overview.shtml (last visited Jan. 20,
2005). The tenth release, in September 2001, of the SNP Consortium database
contained 1,255,326 SNPs anchored to the human genome. Id.
120. Merges, supra note 115, at 190.
121. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 720 (2000).
122. Id. at 726.
123. Joseph S. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimate of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). Depending on the drug
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company develops a technology, the company likely licenses the
124
technology to hedge risk in areas ancillary to the business.
Professor Walsh and collaborators found that restricted access
to upstream technology “has not been especially problematic” in
125
impeding innovation in biomedical research.
These
commentators concluded that the possibility exists where access to
upstream technologies is impeded and this requires ongoing
126
scrutiny.
More specifically, survey respondents reported that
negotiations over rights to intellectual property from many owners
127
seldom result in a project’s cancellation.
The total royalty
payments for multiple input technologies in a drug development
program range from one to five percent of sales, and are somewhat
128
higher for exclusive licenses.
The cost of purchasing patented
reagents was found to be two to four times higher than making in129
house versions of the same reagents.
b.

Anticommons Problem

Conversely, other authors believe that there is an
anticommons problem and have proposed various solutions.
Professor Mueller suggests that it is possible to resolve the
anticommons problem.
Mueller suggests expanding the
experimental use doctrine so that researchers may use patented
research tools for follow-on research without automatic
130
disqualification from the experimental use doctrine.
Professor
Mueller argues that a researcher who does not hold the patent to a
industry’s accounting, the industry’s $800 million figure may be an overestimate.
Half of the $800 million involves “opportunity costs” with the money if invested in
equities. Removal of built-in profits would make the research and development
costs $108 million ninety-three percent of the time and $400 million seven percent
of the time. The $800 million estimate also fails to include taxpayer subsidies
through deductions and credits. Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Will Lower Drug
Prices Jeopardize Drug Research?, Physicians for a National Health Program, available
at http://www.pnhp.org/news/2004/february/will _lower_drug_pric.php (last
visited Jan. 20, 2005).
124. See Kieff, supra note 121, at 726.
125. JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 331
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 298.
128. Id. at 300.
129. Id.
130. See Mueller, supra note 91, at 9 (suggesting this approach where there are
high transaction costs required for using patented research tools).
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research tool should be allowed the use of the tool, but any
products developed as a result would be subject to a “reach131
through” royalty.
NIH does not favor reach-through royalties
132
Others have
because they can inhibit downstream research.
suggested that it would be wise to implement an experimental use
exception, especially for researchers undertaking pre-competitive
133
research.
Professor Leibovitz intones that non-exclusive patents would
“alleviate monopolistic power while accommodating the practical
134
peculiarities of different situations.”
He proposes a system that
135
does not grant exclusive property rights to inventors. These nonexclusive rights would protect an inventor against “free-riding
competitors” but would not protect against “competitors who
136
independently develop the same technology.”
Implementation
of non-exclusive patents would “reduce the possibility of
anticompetitive
behavior
in
the
commercialization
of
137
technologies.”
The difficulty in implementing this proposal
centers on determining in which cases such misappropriation had
138
occurred and where monopolistic power could be invoked.
Professor Gitter suggests that Congress should create a
compulsory licensing scheme for patents on human DNA sequence
139
and codify the experimental use exception.
A compulsory

131. Id. at 55.
132. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64
Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,091 (Dec. 23, 1999) (final notice)
Royalties on the sale of a final product that does not embody the tool, or
other reach-through rights directed to a final product that does not
embody the tool, discourage use of tools and are not appropriate in these
circumstances. Royalties on the sale of final products are more
appropriate to situations where a for-profit entity seeks to commercialize
the tool, e.g., by developing a marketable product or service, or
incorporating the tool into a marketable product or service.
Id.
133. Sandy Thomas, Reply to “Impact of Patenting on R&D and Commerce,” 21
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 730 (2003); See also David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest
Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (2004).
134. John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251,
2265 (2002).
135. Id. at 2268.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2270.
138. Id. at 2268.
139. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences
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licensing scheme would permit further use of the research, and
allocate royalties for inventors based on the invention’s commercial
value while allowing researchers access to DNA sequence data at a
140
fair price. The approach would also allow scientists in public and
nonprofit institutions to conduct non-commercially oriented
141
research free of charge.
Such an approach would work to
142
harmonize United States and European Union patent law.
One commentator has proposed amending the Physician
Immunity Statute to allow patient access to diagnostic testing of any
143
gene, whether patented or not. In 2002, there was a proposal for
similar legislation that would have allowed the use of human
genetic information for research and diagnostic purposes without
144
the threat of patent infringement.
Congress did not pass this
145
legislation.
Ethicist Williams-Jones notes that “intellectual property
protection affects the costs and, therefore, the availability of health
146
care services . . . .”
Some commentators’ note that whatever
portions of public funds are expended on health care, it is
147
impossible to cover all beneficial services.
The increased cost of
patented genetic tests makes it more difficult to justify providing
148
such testing services to the public.
The costs of using patented PCR tests and DNA sequencing

in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and
a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679 (2001).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gregory P. Lekovic, Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A
Proposal to Amend “The Physician Immunity Statute,” 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 275, 296 (2004). The author proposed amending 35 U.S.C. § 287
(c)(2)(A)(iii) to include the words “other than for purposes of diagnosis” thus
including genetic testing in “medical activity” that is not subject to patent
infringement. Id.
144. Washington Business Information, Legislation to Exempt Genes Used for
Diagnostic Purposes, DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC LETTER, March 15, 2002, available at 2002
WL 8415113.
145. The bills were sent to Committee and no further action was taken.
Legislative Updates, Office of Legislative Policy & Analysis, available at
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/9gene.asp (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005).
146. Bryn Williams-Jones & Michael M. Burgess, Social Contract Theory and Just
Decision Making: Lessons from Genetic Testing for the BRCA Mutations, 14 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 115 (2004).
147. Id. at 118.
148. Id. at 132.
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are paid by diagnostics laboratories because the cost of laboratory
instruments and reagents include the cost of licenses. In addition,
commercial testing laboratories pay a fee for each PCR test that
149
they perform.
The patent on PCR encourages laboratories to
150
develop alternative technology in order to avoid the cost of PCR.
H. The Future of Genetic Testing
Pharmacogenomics is the study of the effect of genetic
151
variation on drug response. The regulation of diagnostic genetic
tests will become increasingly important as pharmacogenomic uses
152
increase. Diagnostic tests, including genetic tests, can determine
if a specific individual has the appropriate genetic makeup to
153
respond
to
treatment
with
a
specific
therapeutic.
Pharmacogenomics, utilizing genetic tests, have been used to
optimize patient treatment with therapeutics. The first example of
this personalized medicine was an HIV test that involved
genotyping the virus in order to determine which drugs would be
154
most effective against a particular virus.
The treatment of certain breast cancers with Herceptin
demonstrates another example of a successful pharmacogenomic
155
approach.
A diagnostic test utilizing either histochemical or
cellular hybridization methods can determine the status of the
156
human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER 2) gene. About
twenty-five percent of breast cancers contain an overabundance of
157
either the HER2 gene or too many HER2 receptors. Herceptin is
a monoclonal antibody that binds specifically to HER2 receptors.

149. Telephone Interview with Matt Bower, Certified Genetic Counselor,
Fairview University Medical Center (Oct. 22, 2004).
150. Id.
151. The term pharmacogenomics is often used interchangeably with
pharmacogenetics. Cambridge Healthtech Inst., Pharmacogenomic Glossary,
available at http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/pharmacogenomics.asp
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
152. Kathryn R. Phillips et al., Genetic Testing and Pharmacogenomics: Issues for
Determining the Impact to Healthcare Delivery and Costs, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 425,
429 (2004).
153. Id. at 426.
154. HIV serological diagnosis was the first example of testing to match a
patient with a treatment, here based on the serotype of the virus.
155. Genentech, Inc., How Herceptin Works, available at http://www.hercep
tin.com/herceptin/patient/f_works/works.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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When combined with chemotherapy, Herceptin has been shown to
have a high probability of responding in women of the appropriate
158
genotype.
The expansion of new market systems will only increase with
159
the move to pharmacogenomics. A noted biotechnology industry
analyst has predicted that genetic testing will become increasingly
160
routine.
Healthcare will move toward more “predictive,
preventative care with [increased] pre-symptomatic [diagnostics]
161
and [therapeutic prescriptions].”
This increased demand for
predictive genetic testing will require affordability for individual
tests as multiple genetic tests will likely be run simultaneously.
III. PROPOSED RULEMAKING: NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF
GENOMIC INVENTIONS
In response to perceived inequities in the quantity and quality
of healthcare services that are dependent upon genomic
technologies, NIH introduced draft guidelines for the nonexclusive licensing of genomic inventions, including “nucleic acidbased diagnostics, potential gene therapy applications, and the
162
development of new DNA and RNA-based therapeutics.”
Genomic inventions covered in the NIH draft guidelines include:
“materials such as cDNAs; expressed sequence tags (ESTs);
haplotypes; antisense molecules; small interfering RNAs (siRNAs);
full-length genes and their expression products; as well as methods
and instrumentation for the sequencing of genomes, quantification
of nucleic acid molecules, detection of single nucleotide
163
polymorphisms (SNPs), and genetic modifications.”
The Draft Best Practices suggests a tripartite plan. The first
158.
159.

Id.
Nina Flanagan, Tailored Medicine no Longer Science Fiction, 24 GENETIC
ENGINEERING NEWS 30 (Sept. 30, 2004).
160. G. Stephen Burrill, State of the Biotechnology Industry . . . Circa 2004 (Oct.
11, 2004), available at http://www.burrillandco.com/pdfs/Laguna-Laguna.pdf.
161. Id.
162. E-mail from Jack Spiegel, Senior Advisor for Technology Transfer
Operations, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health, to
Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (July 1, 2004, 10:08 EST)
(containing attachments draft Licensing Genomic Inventions and Jack Spriegel,
Address before the Association of University Technology Managers on Draft Best
Practices (Mar. 4-6, 2004)) [hereinafter Spriegel Address] (on file with author);
David Malakoff, NIH Roils Academe with Advice on Licensing DNA Patents, 303 SCI.
1757 (2004).
163. Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67747.
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prong seeks “patent protection on genomic inventions [that
require] significant further research and development by the
private sector . . . to bring the invention to practical and
164
commercial application.”
The second prong incorporates nonexclusive licensing “whenever possible [especially for] broad
165
enabling technologies and research uses. . . .”
The third prong
exclusively licenses technology when “necessary to encourage
166
Under the
research and development by private partners. . . .”
third prong, it will be important to control the scope of the
invention by limiting “indications, fields of use, and territories . . .
to be commensurate with the abilities and commitment of licensees
167
to bring the technology to market expeditiously.”
To ensure
expeditious development, the Draft Best Practices recommend
utilizing milestones, benchmarks, and performance-based royalty
payments; monitoring and enforcing performance; and
168
sublicensing.
It will also be important to address public health
benefits by: (1) seeking to protect research uses, (2) seeking fair
return on public investment, (3) recognizing public health goals,
169
and (4) enhancing public access and availability.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Genetic Testing Introduction
NIH bases the need for rule making on “[a]necdotal and
170
empirical data” that “reveal[s] a pattern of exclusive licensing.”
In addition, there is a need to “balance[] the expansion of
knowledge and direct public health benefit with the commercial
171
needs of private interests.”
Examples of genetic tests previously developed and
implemented in clinical laboratories are discussed below. A
comparison of the tests describes the disease, the genetic defect,
the type of test, source of funds for test development, and testing
cost. The examples described below include the exclusive licensing
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 67748.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Spiegel Address, supra note 162.
Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67747.
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of BRCA1 and BRCA2 by Myriad Genetics, Canavan Disease test
172
These
development, and hereditary hemochromatosis testing.
examples are compared with non-exclusive licenses for Cystic
Fibrosis and Huntington Disease testing. Finally, there is the
recent example of the PXE disease gene patent that is issued to an
173
individual followed by licensing to a patient advocacy group.
1.

Breast/Ovarian Cancer Testing with BRCA1/BRCA2

Mutations in both BRCA1 and BRCA2 result in a
predisposition to breast cancer, ovarian cancer, prostate cancer
174
The risk of
(BRCA1), as well as other cancers (BRCA2).
developing cancers associated with these genes is unknown and
appears to be “variable even within families of similar ethnic
175
background with the same mutation.” Of women diagnosed with
breast cancer each year, “only 5 to 10% are likely to have [a genetic
predisposition] associated with increased risk of developing the
176
disease.” Depending on the specific mutation and family history,
the “cumulative lifetime risk is 40 to 85% for breast cancer, and 16
177
to 40% for ovarian cancer. . . .”
“But even [with these] very
accurate testing methods, only 20 to 25% of patients with a strong
178
family history... will have a positive BRCA mutation. . . .”
This
means that for “75 to 80% of breast cancer patients, the heritable
179
component of their [disease] remains unknown.” In addition to
the genetic factors, “social and environmental factors” may affect
180
the development of breast cancer.
172. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.1-9.
173. See Press Release PXE International, supra note 39.
174. Nancie Petrucell et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Hereditary Breast/Ovarian Cancer,
(last revision Sept. 3, 2004), GENEREVIEWS, available at http://www.genetests.org/
servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key=m41BLW6o3jUNg&gry=
&fcn=y&fw=Di2T&filename=/profiles/brca1/index.html.
175. Id.
176. Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 123.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. There is some genetic association of Chek2, BRCA2, ESR1, CYP1B1,
COMT, PGR, BRCA1, VEGF, TGFB, CYP17, HSD17B1, patched, sulfotransferase
1A1, HER2 codon 655, NAT2, VDR, XRCC2, TP53, EBAG9, ADRB2, MnSOD,
HER-2/neu, CYP19, AR, PR, IGFBP7, GSTP1, RB1, cerbB2, estrogen receptor,
cHaras1, and Lmyc genes with breast cancer. Genetic Association Database,
National Institute on Aging, available at http://geneticassociationdb.nih.gov (last
visited Oct. 20, 2004) (searching on “breast cancer” results in a list of genes
associated with the disease).
180. See Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 124.
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Myriad Genetics (Myriad) controls the testing for BRCA1 and
BRCA2, and retains exclusive licenses for the use of the genes in
181
diagnostic testing.
Myriad initially charged $2,400 for both the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests and currently charges a list price of
182
The cost of these tests is high because they require
$2,975.
183
sequencing 35,000 base pairs of DNA. The company negotiated a
deal with the National Cancer Institute in 2002 and, as a result,
reduced licensing fees to $1,200 for combined BRCA1 and BRCA2
184
testing, $600 for BRCA1 alone, and $750 for BRCA2 alone.
Myriad noted in its annual report that its profit margin from
185
For the
the diagnostics testing business is sixty-eight percent.
fiscal year ending June 30, 2004, Myriad’s estimated cost of testing
186
is $944.
Estimates of the cost of contract sequencing a gene
alone, without the cost of oligonucleotide synthesis, is between
187
$945 and $1,050.
Myriad estimates that it spent $2 million to
develop the genetic tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2. In 2004, Myriad
188
due to its research
reported a net loss of $40.6 million
181. See Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover Exploiting the US Patent System: A
Single Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer,
and Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to Play by Its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24,
2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 4113872; MATTHEW RIMMER, Myriad Genetics: Patent
Law and Genetic Testing, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 20 (2003).
182. David B. Resnik, Are DNA Patents Bad for Medicine?, 65 HEALTH POLICY 181,
186 (2002). BRACAnalysis® analysis for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer
involves sequencing the genes in both directions for a total of approximately
35,000 bp, costs $2,975, and is covered by all major health maintenance
organizations. Myriad Genetics, Inc., SEC Annual Report (Form 10-K) for fiscal
year ending June 30, 2004, [hereinafter Myriad 10-K] at http://www.edgaronline.com/bin/cobrand/?doc=A-8999230001047469-04-028434&nav=1&form
type=10%2DK.
183. Telephone Interview with Bill Rusconi, Vice President of Marketing,
Myriad Genetics (September 24, 2004).
184. Resnik, supra note 182, at 186.
185. See Myriad 10-K, supra note 182.
186. Id. Profit margins have steadily increased for fiscal years ending June 30:
in 2001 profits were 56.68% of sales; in 2002 profits were 60.1% of sales; in 2003
profits were 63.81% of sales; and in 2004 profits were 68.24% of sales. Id. Based
on profit margins for 2004, the cost alone of running tests would be $619 for
MLH1 and MSH2 (hereditary nonpolypopsis colorectal cancer syndrome) and
$535 for APC (familial adenomatous polyposis). Services and Price List, Myriad
Genetics Laboratories, Inc., (effective as of 02/15/04). The ratio of tests done for
BRCA1 and BRCA2 to those done for MLH1 and MSH2 is between five and ten to
one. Rusconi, supra note 183.
187. E-mail from David Gingrich, DNA Sequencing, Colorado State University,
to Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (Sept. 27, 2004,
14:27:22 CST) (on file with author).
188. See Myriad 10-K, supra note 182, at 4.
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expenditures in developing therapeutics, including Flurizan, its
lead therapeutic candidate for the treatment of Alzheimer’s
189
disease.
2.

Canavan Disease

The Greenbergs had two children who both developed
190
The Greenbergs decided to lead an effort to
Canavan disease.
identify the gene for the disease so that their children’s struggle
191
with the disease would not be in vain.
They worked with Dr.
Reuben Matalon, a physician working at the University of Illinois
192
Hospital in Chicago. The Greenbergs helped Dr. Matalon obtain
tissue samples from other children suffering from Canavan disease
193
and their parents.
The Greenbergs also raised donations and
194
The Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) hired Dr.
grants.
195
Matalon to establish a center for research on genetic diseases. In
1993, Dr. Matalon isolated the Canavan gene and MCH applied for
196
a patent on the gene. Dr. Matalon assigned all of his rights to the
197
gene in his contract to MCH.
MCH charges $12.50 per test to
198
The Greenbergs sued MCH
laboratories that perform the test.
199
200
and lost. Genzyme currently provides Canavan testing for $225.
3.

Hereditary Hemochromatosis

Hereditary hemochromatosis is a common autosomal recessive
disease with as many as 80 to 85% of the cases caused by the two
201
most common alleles of the HFE gene (C282Y and H63D).
189. See id. at 3 (providing that Flurizan recently completed phase I of human
clinical trials).
190. See Resnik, supra note 182, at 185.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997). Canavan disease was
shown to be a mutation in the aspartoacylase gene resulting in accumulation of Nacetylaspartic acid in the brain. Id.
197. Resnik, supra note 182, at 185.
198. Id.
199. Id. See generally Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Res. Inst., Inc., 208
F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
200. Telephone Interview with Customer Service, Genzyme Genetics (Oct. 26,
2004) [hereinafter Genzyme Interview].
201. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577
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Testing for hemochromatosis requires a PCR amplification step.
Bio-Rad Laboratories (Bio-Rad) currently holds the rights to
hemochromatosis testing and either requires purchase of reagents
202
from Bio-Rad or a license to perform the test in the laboratory.
203
Bio-Rad charges $84 for the chemicals required for the test. Bio204
Rad charges royalties up to $20 per test.
One clinical laboratory
205
A survey of clinical
charges $163 for the hemochromatosis test.
laboratories testing for hereditary hemochromatosis showed that
limiting testing to the patented test discouraged the development
206
of better or less-expensive tests.
Bio-Rad, however, has entered
into an exclusive licensing agreement with Nanogen for use of the
207
hemochromatosis test on a proprietary nanochip system.
The
208
patents on these alleles expire during 2015 and 2016.
A quick survey of the European Patent Office databases shows
that there are a number of new patent applications for
209
hemochromatosis testing.
Some applications are by other
research groups and others are follow-on inventions from the
(Feb. 7, 2002).
202. Id. at 578.
203. Reagents for twenty-four tests cost $2016. Product no. 406-1262, mDx
Hereditary Hemochromatosis ASR, Bio-Rad Laboratories, available at http://www.
biorad.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
204. See Merz, supra note 201, at 579.
205. CompGene Fees, at http://www.compgene.com/fees.htm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2005) [hereinafter CompGene Fees].
206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. Bio-Rad Enters Licensing Deal With Nanogen, East Bay Business Times,
available
at
http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2002/06/24/daily
27.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (quoting John Goetz, vice president of BioRad's clinical diagnostics group, as saying "The demand for molecular-based tests
used to detect genetic disorders continues to increase, and we believe the
agreement with Nanogen will help accelerate that trend by providing laboratories
a greater variety of licensed hemochromatosis testing options.").
208. U.S. Patent No. 5,705,343 (issued Jan. 6, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,712,098
(issued Jan. 27, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,438 (issued May 19, 1998).
209. U.S. Patent Application No. 2,004,101,868 (published May 27, 2004).
Entitled “Analysis method for hemochromatosis mutation,” the abstract posits that
it is “possible to combine three concepts each known separately in prior art from
different sources: allele specific PCR, mutagenically separated PCR, and amplicon
identification by specific dissociation curves.” Id. In addition this method was
claimed to be “significantly more straightforward and economic” than those is the
prior art. Id. U.S. Patent Application No. 2,004,086,862 (published May 6, 2004)
(entitled “Method and probes for the genetic diagnosis of hemochromatosis,” and
claiming methods and probes for hybridizing with nucleic acids with HFE
mutations in a biological sample); U.S. Patent Application No. 2,003,148,972
(published Aug. 7, 2003) (entitled “Hereditary hemochromatosis gene” and
consists of a follow-on invention from original inventors).
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group that patented the original sequence. This shows that
innovation has not been completely stifled by the patenting of the
gene.
4.

Huntington’s Disease

The test for Huntington’s Disease (HD) requires a
determination of the number of CAG repeats in the 5’ coding
210
The CAG repeat is expanded in individuals with
sequence.
211
Huntington’s Disease.
The assay is a Southern blot and
approximately 85 to 93% of individuals with HD can be correctly
212
Currently, no treatment for the disease exists.
diagnosed.
Quotes for the cost of Huntington’s Disease testing are between
213
$190 and $200 per test.
5.

Cystic Fibrosis

Cystic fibrosis is the most common disease in humans but
there is currently no simple test available for genetic testing
because a large number of different genetic mutations can result in
214
the disease.
Because of this genetic complexity, the American
College of Medical Genetics recommended a panel of twenty-five
215
common alleles for testing. The gene was patented and licensed
216
Cystic fibrosis testing with this
non-exclusively for $2 per test.
217
panel costs between $150 and $300.

210. Brendan
Haigh,
Huntington
Disease,
GENEREVIEWS,
at
http://www.genetests. org (last modified May 25, 2004).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Genzyme Interview, supra note 200; CompGene Fees, supra note 205.
214. Cystic fibrosis is caused by mutations in the gene encoding the cystic
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR). Gregory P. Lekovic,
Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A Proposal to Amend The Physician
Immunity Statute, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 275, 276 n.6 (2004).
215. Moskowitz
et
al.,
CFTR-Related
Disorders,
GENEREVIEWS,
at
http://www.genetests.org/ (last modified Aug. 24, 2004).
216. U.S. Patent No. 5,776,677 (issued July 7, 1998); Peter Gorner, Parents
Suing over Patenting of Genetic Test They Say the Researchers They Assisted are Trying to
Profit from a Test for a Rare Disease, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2000, at 1, available at 2000
WL 3735425.
217. CompGene Fees, supra note 205; Genzyme Interview, supra note 200;
Telephone Interview with Chrissi Coolbaugh, Client Services, Ambry Genetics
(Oct. 26, 2004) (noting that Ambry Genetics charges $200 for three selected
mutations, or for sequencing the entire gene, $450 for patients and $495 for
institutions).
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Alzheimer’s disease

Alzheimer’s Disease remains the most common cause of
218
dementia in North America and Europe.
There is currently no
219
There is a significant association of the
curative treatment.
220
disease with the Apolipoprotein E (ApoE) gene.
Duke
University, with NIH funding, developed the test for ApoE
221
alterations and Athena Diagnostics holds the exclusive license.
Testing for the ApoE gene from Athena Diagnostics costs between
222
$295 and $450.
7.

Familial Colon Cancer

Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon Cancer (HNPCC) is
associated with mutations in four genes in the mismatch repair
223
pathway.
Mutations in two of these genes, MLH1 and MSH2,
account for approximately ninety percent of detected mutations in
224
Myriad tests for two of the four genes
families with HNPCC.
225
involved in (HNPCC), MLH1 and MSH2. The cost is $1,950 and
requires approximately sixty-seven percent of the sequencing
226
required for the BRCA1 and BRCA1 sequences. Ambry Genetics,
a competitor of Myriad, sequences the same two genes for an
227
institutional cost of $1,395 and a patient cost of $1,295.

218. Thomas D. Bird, Alzheimer Disease Overview, GENEREVIEWS, (last revision on
Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.genetests.org/.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167 (issued Apr. 16, 1996).
222. The lower charge is for billing facilities and the higher charge is for
billing commercial insurance. Telephone Interview with Customer Service, Athena
Diagnostics (Oct. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Athena].
223. Wendy Kohlmann & Stephen B. Gruber, Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon
Cancer, GENEREVIEWS (Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://www.genetests.org/.
224. Id.
225. Comprehensive COLARIS® analysis for familial colorectal cancer by
sequencing MLH1 and MSH2 (about two-thirds as many bases as BRCA1 and
BRCA2) is $1950 and is covered by all major health maintenance organizations. See
Myriad 10-K, supra note 182.
226. See Rusconi, supra note 183.
227. E-mail from Chrissi Coolbaugh, Client Services, Ambry Genetics, to
Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (Oct. 29, 2004, 14:33:03
CST) (on file with author). Sequence of either MLH1 or MSH2 costs $700 for the
patient and $750 for an institution. Id.
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Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy

Molecular genetic testing of the Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy (DMD) gene is available clinically and can establish the
disease diagnosis without a muscle biopsy in the majority of DMD
228
cases and Becker Muscular Dystrophy. The cost of testing ranges
229
from $425 to $695.
9.

Spinocerebellar Ataxias

There are a number of genes, which affect spinocerebellar
230
ataxias (SCA).
The University of Minnesota, with NIH funding,
developed the SCA-1 genetic test, and Athena Diagnostics holds the
231
patent and exclusive license.
The cost for the SCA-1 test, and
232
other SCA tests individually, is $395 to $550.
B. Positions of Professional Associations on Genetic Testing
The Council on Governmental Regulations (Council) is an
association of research universities that has been involved in the
development of financial and administrative aspects of federally
233
funded research since 1948.
The Council complained about the
234
The
process involved in adjusting the licensing practices.
Council believes this is an example of NIH amending its granting
235
regulations and requirements with little, if any, formal process.
236
The Council is unsure if data supports NIH assumptions.
The executive board of the Academy of Clinical Laboratory
237
Physicians and Scientists’ (ACLPS)
approved its resolution

228. Bruce R. Korf et al., Dystrophinopathies, GENEREVIEWS (Oct. 1, 2004), at
http://www.genetests.org.
229. See Athena, supra note 222.
230. There are tests for Spinocerebellar Ataxia Type 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14
and 17. See GeneTests, supra note 20.
231. U.S. Patent No. 5,741,645 (issued Apr. 21, 1998).
232. See Athena, supra note 222.
233. Council on Governmental Relations, Agenda: Meeting at the Council of
Governmental Relations 10-14, available at http://206.151.87.67/docs/AgendaJune
04.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Academy of Clinical Laboratory Physicians and Scientists, ACLPS
Resolution: Exclusive Licenses for Diagnostic Tests Approved by the ACLPS Executive
Council (June 3, 1999), available at http://depts.washington.edu/lmaclps/
license.htm.
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regarding exclusive licenses for diagnostic tests. The resolution
recommends:
Physicians and scientists should oppose patent licensing
agreements that inappropriately limit clinical care,
medical training, and medical research; Government and
non-profit institutions that hold patents controlling in
vitro diagnostic testing services should not issue exclusive
licenses for these patents unless there is a clear and
compelling need for exclusivity in order to make the
technology available to the public. Such cases are
expected to be extremely rare; when patent holders
choose to require royalty-bearing licenses for use of their
technology for in vitro diagnostic testing, such licenses
should be nonexclusive and available to any qualified,
CLIA-certified laboratory on an equal basis. Financial
terms for such licenses should be reasonable; license
agreements should be free of any terms that dictate
specific methods of testing, methods of reporting results,
238
or clinical uses of the test.
The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) also
issued a position statement on genetic testing:
The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
to permit the patenting of naturally occurring genes and
disease-causing mutations has produced numerous
difficulties... Enforcement has been effected in one or
more of these ways: monopolistic licensing that limits a
given genetic test to a single laboratory, royalty-based
licensing agreements with exorbitant up-front fees and
per-test fees, and licensing agreements that seek
proportions of reimbursement from testing services.
These limit the accessibility of competitively priced
genetic testing services and hinder test-specific
development of national programs for quality assurance.
They also limit the number of knowledgeable individuals
who can assist physicians, laboratory geneticists and
counselors in the diagnosis, management and care of atrisk patients. Further, restricting the availability of gene
testing has long-term implications beyond patient care. It
affects the training of the next generation of medical and
laboratory geneticists, physicians, and scientists in the area
enveloped by the patent or license. It also retards the

238.

Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/10

30

Weck: Note: Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a Negative
10WECK.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 4:31:31 PM

EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF DNA DIAGNOSTICS

1087

usually very rapid improvement of a test that occurs
through the addition of new mutations or the use of new
techniques by numerous laboratories that have
accumulated samples from affected individuals over many
years. Therefore, it is the ACMG’s position that: Genes
and their mutations are naturally occurring substances
that should not be patented. Patents on genes with
clinical implications must be very broadly licensed.
Licensing agreements should not limit access through
239
excessive royalties and other unreasonable terms.
C. Is This New Rulemaking Justified?
Genetic testing requires balancing a variety of interests. The
rights of the patient, the patent holder, the government funding
agency, the doctor and the insurance company all need to be
240
considered.
Protection of these interests requires “patient
choice, neutral genetic counseling, physician involvement, and
241
regulation of process and information management.”
If health care providers can be convinced that the predictive
savings from diagnostic tests offset the cost of testing, they will be
242
willing to reimburse the costs of testing.
However, if an
individual is not part of an insurance pool, e.g., lacks insurance
through employment, then genetic discrimination may become a
243
possibility.
This possibility varies from state to state. One
commentator noted that genetic “counselors ‘routinely advise’
clients not to pursue health insurance reimbursement because of
244
the ‘potential risk in obtaining future health and life insurance.’”
There is empirical evidence of negative effects for exclusive
licensing. This note’s brief survey of commercialized genetic tests
shows that the monopoly right granted by patent exclusive
239. American College of Medical Genetics, Position Statement of Gene Patents
and Accessibility of Gene Testing, (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://genetics.faseb.org
/genetics/acmg/pol-34.htm.
240. See Allen C. Nunnally, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate
Biotechnology in the New Genetic Age, 8 B.U.J. SCI. TECH. L. 306 (2002) (reviewing “the
prominent problems that underlie commercialized genetic testing” and offering
recommendations for commercialized diagnostic genetic testing).
241. Id. at 337.
242. See Chahine, supra note 104, at 419.
243. See Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to
Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 44-56 (2002)
(analyzing, in part, the health insurance industry and the states regulation of it).
244. Id. at 51.
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245

licensing results in increased costs to licensees.
Although it is
very difficult to make head-to-head comparisons of genetic tests for
different diseases, as each genetic defect is unique and the
concomitant tests differ in complexity, the evidence indicates that
246
exclusive licenses increase the cost of testing two to three-fold.
247
Some laboratories have discontinued using specific tests.
In
other markets outside the United States, the increased prices have
248
The
had a documented effect on the delivery of health care.
evidence is strongest for a decline in breast cancer testing (BRCA1
249
and BRCA2) in Canada and the European Union.
A large number of independent laboratories carry out genetic
tests. Most of the tests utilize routine molecular biological
techniques and reagents that should be easily transferable from a
scientific publication. Some university laboratories have the time
and inclination to develop laboratory tests from published recipes.
Conversely, not all laboratories will want to develop their own tests
and will instead find satisfaction by purchasing reagents (ASRs)
from commercial research test developers. The commercial
production of reagents would increase both quality and price, but
these price increases would not match those associated with
patented tests.
For example, reagent costs are probably higher for genetic
tests with a requirement for synthetic oligonucleotides. Nonexclusive licensing might switch development to reagent companies
instead of to companies that are providing genetic testing services.
Laboratories could establish consortia for purchasing specialized
reagents.
245. See supra Part IV.
246. Id.
247. See supra Part II.F.
248. See Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 119-20, 125. The
patenting of the BRCA genes led to a tripling of prices in Canada. See Bryn
Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of
Commercial BRCA Testing 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 142 (2002) (describing the patenting
by Myriad Genetics of the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are associated with
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer). From July 2001 to February 2003, in-house
BRCA testing was halted at the Hereditary Cancer Agency at the British Columbia
Cancer Agency in Vancouver, British Columbia. Id. The Institut Curie in Paris,
France argues that the Myriad BRCA testing misses 10 to 20% of mutations
jeopardizing the quality and usefulness of the information. Id. at 139. Complying
with patent requirements would result in an estimated additional cost of thirty-sixmillion francs ($4.8 million) to hospital budgets. Id.
249. See Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and
Application of Commerical BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123 (2002).
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It will be important under the new draft guidelines to
distinguish the non-exclusive and exclusive licensing categories
250
created by the “when possible” and “when necessary” language.
The first consideration would be the number of interested
potential licensees for a specific genetic test. If there were only one
potential licensee, the use of milestones and benchmarks would
251
ensure the development of the technology.
This would also
ensure licensing of the genetic test. The second consideration
would be the number of individuals affected by the disease. The
Orphan Drug Act defines a “rare disease or condition” for
development of drugs as “any disease or condition which . . . affects
252
less than 200,000 persons in the United States . . . .”
This
number, or another appropriate number of affected individuals,
could be used to determine the genetic test for which exclusive
licensing would be necessary. The third consideration might
include the complexity of the test for the disease, because the cost
of testing relates directly to the number of mutations causing the
disease. When establishing criteria for exclusive licensing, a
proposed regulation must require that newly developed genetic
tests not be frequently monopoly-priced.
A broad definition of “research use” is imperative under the
proposed rulemaking. This broad definition becomes especially
important with genetic diseases because the initial observations of
allele prevalence may vary following analysis of different ethnic
subpopulations. Ongoing research with the genetic tools is
essential to improve genetic testing for a particular disease.
V. CONCLUSION
The non-exclusive licensing of genetic tests, as recommended
in NIH’s new rulemaking, is necessary to allow potentially affected
253
individuals broad access to genetic testing. It is also necessary to
strike a balance between encouraging further development of
genetic tests with federal funding, patent protection for university
research, and development of that technology into viable
254
commercial products and broad access to health care.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra Part III.
Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67748.
21 U.S.C.A. § 360ee (b)(2) (West 2001).
See supra Part III.
Id.
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Patenting of genes for genetic testing has different standards
255
in the United States and Europe. The United States’ standard for
patenting DNA sequences requires a specific and substantial utility,
and the United States grants more patents with broader coverage
256
than the European standards allow.
Europeans have expressed
great concern that increasing patent coverage for genetic testing
257
will negatively influence healthcare access and costs.
The enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act more than twenty years
ago has been a boon for university technology transfer departments
258
and an additional source of income for universities. Patents and
licenses on biological inventions were incentives that furthered the
259
development of the biotechnology industry.
Concurrently, the
reduction in breadth of the experimental use exception has
reduced academic experimentation that could be undertaken to
support further development and understanding of population
260
effects of genetic tests.
Survey evidence from various laboratories indicates that
patenting of diagnostic tests reduces the amount of
experimentation at local laboratories. It has been suggested that
the anticommons effect on upstream inventions has stifled
261
downstream inventions. Academic positions have been proffered
262
For those who see an
on both sides of the anticommons divide.
anticommons problem, solutions include compulsory licensing,
263
non-exclusive patents, and expanded access to diagnostic testing.
As the number of pharmacogenetic tests expands in the future,
assuring access to genetic testing will become increasingly
important.
Each disease diagnostic is unique. It is not possible to
compare the average price of an exclusively licensed test to a non264
exclusively licensed test. The cost of a genetic test is determined
by the complexity, variety and number of genetic variants, and the

255. See supra Part II.B-C.
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258. See supra Part II.D.
259. Id.
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complexity of the technique involved (DNA sequencing or other
265
allelism tests). The more complex tests have higher costs as well
266
as attendant monopoly costs associated with patent rights. Using
the BRCA test as an example, the cost of providing the test in a
267
These
dedicated laboratory is one-third of the market list price.
increased costs can make it necessary to reduce overall testing in
268
order to pay for testing for selected individuals.
A number of
professional associations have spoken out against the patenting of
genes for diagnostic tests or for the use of non-exclusive licensing
269
provisions.
The non-exclusive licensing of DNA diagnostics is necessary to
ensure that genetic tests are widely available at reasonable costs.
The policy of federally funding research to promote basic
discoveries must be balanced with mechanisms for rapidly
developing those technologies at reasonable costs that then
support laboratory implementation within a suitable time frame.
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